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7 May 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Report of Message Center Operations  
1 - 30 April 1953

1. Cables Processed

a. Tab A provides statistical data regarding cables processed during April 1953. The total volume was 8 1/4% less than the volume for March, representing a 7.2% drop in CIA cables and virtually a 10% drop in non-CIA cables. March was the heaviest month we have had; April is the second heaviest.

b. Cables selected, briefed, and distributed to the Director totalled 588. This figure represents 2.6% of the total volume of cables processed, and is 8 1/4% less than the volume distributed to the Director the preceding month. Note that the percentage decrease in cables distributed to the Director exactly duplicates the percentage decrease in total cables processed.

2. Personnel

a. I was on annual leave for the period 6 through 10 April.

b. I attended a series of 5 meetings conducted by  on the conservation of human resources. I feel that the meetings were quite constructive and I am planning to send certain of the CSDO's and Supervisors to subsequent meetings.

c. On approximately 13 April 1953, I forwarded to   my recommendation that career management planning for Cable Secretariat and Message Center personnel be handled by

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other than the Office of Communications Career Service Board or be considered apart from Commo standards. This is the paper addressed to you which you agreed to my sending to Commo. I have not yet received any fromal reply from [redacted]

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### 3. Cable Distribution

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a. [redacted] DD/P-PPC, requested a change in his distribution in order that he might receive essentially the same information as that furnished to DD/P. Accordingly, distribution to [redacted] was changed, effective 27 April 1953, to include virtually every cable distributed to DD/P. He will not, of course, receive the "eyes only" type cables.

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b. Effective 11 April 1953, we began to prepare briefs for DD/P and to make the distribution for DD/P identical to that for DCI and D/DCI.

c. We are now furnishing to DD/A, for those cables on which both DCI and DD/A receive distribution, identities for cryptic references appearing in the cables.

d. The cable distribution requirements for DD/A are still being coordinated by DD/P. I have made known to the office of DD/P-Admin [redacted] that I must have those requirements within the next several days. I feel that it is entirely unnecessary that I be required to effect proper distribution to DD/A when two such offices as DD/P and DD/A are unable to agree upon a cable distribution procedure, despite the fact that I submitted the original requirements for approval last November. [redacted] has told me that he hopes to wind this matter up by Friday, 8 May.

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### 4. Office Procedures

a. In order to tie the personnel more closely together as one functioning unit I have instituted the practice of holding weekly staff conferences on Friday at 1100 hours. The CSDO's and Supervisors attend these conferences.

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b. On 21 April 1953 we received a supply of a new type of outgoing cable form which we are using on a trial basis. Forms have been distributed to FE Division and to the Office of the Director. The form retains the present inter-leaved construction containing a ditto master. To date the copies produced from such ditto masters appear to be considerably more legible than those produced on the ditto masters now in use throughout the Agency. The form has certain undesirable features, however, and it appears that it is not the solution to our problem. We are considering a further revision which we believe will give us a form that retains the good features of the snap-out construction and at the same time eliminates the undesirable features of the present form.

c. During the month we experimented with a new reproduction process which we had hoped would eliminate the necessity for typing ditto masters in order to effect distribution of non-CIA traffic. The machine, known as a Photostat Instant Copier, was loaned to us by OCD. We found that, although the machine might be of value for certain limited reproduction jobs, it was not adequate to handle the volume of work we must process.

#### 5. Cryptic Reference Files

Attached as Tab B is a copy of a memorandum I forwarded to COP outlining the problems we have encountered in referring to our cryptic reference file. The memorandum has been referred to FI/RI, and [ ] has our recommendations under active consideration. In essence, I feel that DD/P has a responsibility not only for removing from our files the true identities of covert personnel, but also for assuring that our files do contain the true identities of non-covert personnel.

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/S/

[ ]  
Cable Secretary

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KEG:tac

Attachments: Tab A  
Tab B

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